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The world macro saving fact concerns the total ﬁnancial saving of the
world’s private sector divided by world GDP. Relative to changes before
1994, there was a huge fall in this ratio between 1995 and 2000, a huge
increase between 2000 and 2003, a huge fall between 2003 and 2006, and a
huge increase between 2006 and 2009. This fact is documented in this paper.
The paper also shows that the ﬂuctuations in this ratio are highly correlated
withﬂuctuationsinworldstockandhousingprices. Itthusappearsthatmuch
of the variation in the world private saving rate can be explained by forces
that affect world asset prices. Changes in these forces are for the most part




rate since 1995 relative to the size of prior ﬂuctuations. It also shows that these
ﬂuctuations are highly correlated with ﬂuctuations in world stock and housing
prices. It thus appears that much of the variation in the world private saving rate
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I am indebted to William Brainard for helpful discussions.can be explained by forces that affect world asset prices. Changes in these forces
are for the most part unpredictable, and so much of the change in the world private
saving rate is unpredictable.
The variable of interest in this paper is as follows. First, a country’s current
account (S) is its ﬁnancial saving vis á vis the rest of the world. If its current
account is in surplus, there is an increase in its net foreign assets, and conversely
if its current account is in deﬁcit. The sum of the current accounts of all countries





is S   SG. Because the sum of S across all countries is zero after converting to a
commoncurrency, thesumofSP isequaltominusthesumofSGafterconverting
each to a common currency. If the sum of SP after converting to a common
currencyispositive, thismeansthereisanetﬂowoffundsfromtheworld’sprivate
sector to the world’s government sector, and conversely if the sum is negative.
The world macro saving fact in this paper concerns the sum of SP (in U.S.
dollars) divided by world GDP (in U.S. dollars). Call this ratio sp. Annual data
on sp are computed from 1980 through 2009. It will be seen that ﬂuctuations in
sp between 1980 and 1994 are small relative to those between 1995 and 2009.
Relative to changes before 1994, there was a huge fall in sp between 1995 and
2000, ahuge increasebetween2000and2003, ahugefallbetween 2003and2006,
and a huge increase between 2006 and 2009. This paper documents this fact and
2then presents a possible explanation.
The fact concerns ﬁnancial saving—ﬂows of funds among sectors and coun-
tries. Financial saving does not distinguish between consumption and investment
expenditures. The ﬁnancial saving of a sector or country is total revenue minus
total expenditures, including expenditures that are classiﬁed in the national in-
come and product accounts as investment expenditures.1 In the GDP deﬁnition
Y = C +I +G+EX  IM, where Y is GDP, C is consumption, I is investment,
G is government spending, EX is the level of exports, and IM is the level of
imports, S as used in this paper is Y   C   I   G, namely the country’s current
account, EX  IM. A country’s saving, on the other hand, which will be denoted
SAV , is Y  C  G, so S = SAV  I. In this paper SAV will be called “saving,”
and S, SP, and SG will be called “ﬁnancial saving.”
Much of the literature on saving behavior is concerned with SAV . It is im-
portant to realize that a country’s current account (S) can be large relative to its
GDP even though it has a low saving rate (because I is small). If one is talking
about which countries are ﬁnancing, say, a large U.S. current account deﬁcit, it is
not necessarily countries with high saving rates. By deﬁnition all current account
deﬁcits are ﬁnanced by current account surpluses (because the sum of S across
countries is zero), but this in itself says nothing about which countries have high
saving rates and which have low saving rates.
Bernanke (2005) in a well known speech discussed the possibility of a global
saving glut in the early 2000s, and econometric studies—for example, Chinn and
1Thedifferencebetweenconsumptionandinvestmentexpendituresinnationalincomeandprod-
uct accounts is, of course, somewhat arbitrary. For example, consumer durable expenditures and
clothing expenditures have an investment component to them, as do educational expenditures.
3Ito (2007) and Gruber and Kamin (2007)—examining this theory followed. In the
econometricworkcurrentaccountbalancesforanumberofcountriesareregressed
on a variety of variables. To the extent that the right hand side variables are
exogenous, these regressions can be considered reduced form regressions. An
issue with this work is that there cannot be a global saving glut regarding current
account balances, since they sum to zero across countries. It is thus not clear
what to make of the regression results regarding a possible global saving glut.
Bernanke’s speech is in fact not really concerned with a global saving glut, but
with the large U.S. current account deﬁcit. He discusses a number of possible
reasons for the large U.S. deﬁcit and for the surpluses of some other countries.
None of this discussion requires the concept of a global saving glut.
Obstfeld (2010) focuses on current account deﬁcits and surpluses leading up
to the world economic slowdown in 2008-2009—what he calls “current account
imbalances.” He discusses possible connections between the imbalances and the
U.S. ﬁnancial crisis, and he argues that there is no simple cause and effect story.
This paper is not concerned with current account imbalances. Instead, the world
is divided into two sectors—private and government—and the ﬁnancial saving of
the world’s private sector is examined, not the ﬁnancial ﬂows among countries.
There is an interesting literature showing that after taking into account capital
gains and losses on net foreign assets, the change in a country’s net foreign as-
sets can be quite different from the country’s current account—see, for example,
Gourinchas and Rey (2007) and Obstfeld (2010). The ﬁnancial ﬂow data used in
this paper do not include capital gains and losses, so these valuation issues are not
taken into account.
4There is ﬁnally a literature explaining the private saving of various countries,
both across time and across countries—see, for example, Maason, Bayoumi, and
Samiei (1998) and Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén (2000). This latter ref-
erence provides a good summary of previous work. In this literature the private
saving rate is regressed on a number of variables, generally using panel data sets.
Again, if the right hand side variables are exogenous, these regressions can be
considered reduced form regressions. Government saving is usually one of the
right hand side variables, which seems problematic. If, say, there is a negative
shock to consumption, thus increasing private saving, this is likely to lead to a
fall in output and income, which will lead to a fall in tax revenue and possibly an
increase in some kinds of government spending. Government saving will thus fall.
Government saving is an endogenous variable, and it is not clear that it should be
on the right hand side of an equation explaining private saving. At any rate, this
is not an issue in this paper. Total private ﬁnancial saving in the world is equal
to the negative of total government ﬁnancial saving in the world, and the latter is
certainly not a variable explaining the former.
2 The Data
Except for the asset data discussed in Section 4, all the data used in this paper
were taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS). Only annual
data were used. The current account for each country in U.S. dollars (S$) was
taken to be (from the Balance of Payments section) the sum of 78ald (current
account, n.i.e.) and 78bcd (capital account, n.i.e.). The latter variable is minor and
5covers net transfers linked to the acquisition of a ﬁxed asset and the net disposal of
nonproduced, nonﬁnancial assets. The sum of these two variables is the balance
on the ﬁnancial account except for net errors and omissions. These variables are
in U.S. dollars.
Government ﬁnancial saving (SG) for each country was taken to be (from the
Government Finance section) agob (net operating balance) if data on this variable
were available or ccsd (cash surplus/deﬁcit) if data on agob were not available. If
the country’s ﬁscal year were not the same as the calendar year, the variable was
converted by interpolation to the calendar year under the assumption that the value
in each quarter of a ﬁscal year is one-fourth the value in the ﬁscal-year. SG is in
units of the country’s currency, and it was converted to U.S. dollars by dividing by
the exchange rate (e): SG$ = SG=e. e is variable rf in the IFS data.
GDP for a country (Y ) was taken to be (from the National Accounts section)
99b or 99b.c. If the data were for the country’s ﬁscal year rather than the calendar
year, the variable was converted by interpolation to the calendar year under the
same assumption mentioned above. Y is in units of the country’s currency, and it
was converted to U.S. dollars by dividing by e: Y $ = Y=e.
The private ﬁnancial saving of a country in U.S. dollars is taken to be: SP$ =
S$   SG$. The country’s private ﬁnancial saving rate is taken to be: sp =
SP$=Y $. The country’s government ﬁnancial saving rate is taken to be: sg =
SG=Y (= SG$=Y $).
The data are thus constructed from only six IFS variables. Data were collected
for every country possible. Prior to 1980 there were many missing observations,
and 1980 was taken to be the ﬁrst year considered. The last year is 2009. In a
6few cases there were small gaps of a year or two in the SG data for a country, and
in these cases values for SG were constructed by interpolating values of sg and
then computing values for SG from the interpolated values for sg and the actual
values for Y . Also, in a few cases values for sg at the end of the period were
extrapolated using the last available value for sg and then computing SG from the
extrapolated values for sg and the actual values for Y . The computed values for
SG then allowed values of sp to be computed.
For the 1980-2009 period, there are 23 countries for which observations on sp
areavailableforallyears. ThesearelistedinTable1. Forthe1990-2009period,19
morecountriesareadded, andforthe2000-2009period, anadditional28countries
are added. These countries are also listed in Table 1. In each group the countries
are listed in the order they appear in the IFS data. What is of interest in this paper
is the sum of SP$ across all countries divided by the sum of Y $, denoted sp. As
a check on the data, it is informative to look at the sum of S$ across all countries
dividedbythesumofY $,denoteds. Thisratioshouldbezero,anditisofinterest
to see how far away from zero it is. sp and s are examined in the next section.
7Table 1
Countries in the Summation
IFS code Country
Group 1: 1980–2009
1 111 UNITED STATES












14 199 SOUTH AFRICA
15 223 BRAZIL
16 233 COLOMBIA
17 238 COSTA RICA
18 273 MEXICO
19 293 PERU
20 456 SAUDI ARABIA










7 419 BAHRAIN, KINGDOM OF
8 436 ISRAEL









18 924 CHINA,P.R.: MAINLAND
19 944 HUNGARY 8Table 1 (continued)




















18 917 KYRGYZ REPUBLIC
19 921 MOLDOVA
20 922 RUSSIAN FEDERATION
21 926 UKRAINE








Table 2 presents values of sp and s for three sets of countries. Observations
begin in 1980 for the ﬁrst set (group 1), 1990 for the second set (groups 1 and
2), and 2000 for the third set (groups 1, 2, and 3). It is important to note that the
summation for the ﬁrst set is always over only countries in that set—countries are
not added as observations become available for them. The values for sp and s
for,say,1990fortheﬁrstsetarethusdifferentthanthoseforthesecondsetbecause
the summation is different. Remember that in principle s should be zero for each
year.
Table 3 is the same as Table 2 except that the United States is excluded for all
calculations. It is of interest to know if the values of sp in Table 2 are dominated
bytheUnitedStates, andthiscanbeseenbycomparingTables2and3. Thevalues
of s in Table 3 are, of course, not expected to be zero because the United States
is excluded from the sum.
Asacheckonthedata, considerﬁrstinTable2howclosethevaluesofs areto
zero. Thevaluesofs rangefrom 0.0136for2006forset1to0.0032for2009for
set 3. The means of the absolute values for the three sets are 0.0061, 0.0045, and
0.0035, respectively. From the IMF World Economic Outlook Database (October
2010 used here) one can get annual data on the world current account balance and
on world GDP (in U.S. dollars). For the 1980–2009 period the ratio of the world
current account balance to world GDP ranges from  0.0078 to 0.0056, and the
mean of the absolute values is 0.0042. This mean compares to the mean of 0.0061
for set 1 in Table 2. The values in Table 2 are thus of roughly the same magnitude
10as
Table 2
Values of sp and s
sp s











1990 0.0248 0.0254  0.0061  0.0055
1991 0.0302 0.0306  0.0038  0.0032
1992 0.0350 0.0346  0.0025  0.0023
1993 0.0380 0.0365 0.0009  0.0002
1994 0.0286 0.0282  0.0015  0.0016
1995 0.0274 0.0265 0.0004  0.0002
1996 0.0222 0.0215  0.0008  0.0011
1997 0.0140 0.0151 0.0018 0.0026
1998 0.0043 0.0058  0.0018  0.0014
1999  0.0113  0.0087  0.0074  0.0067
2000  0.0224  0.0188  0.0164  0.0134  0.0123  0.0075
2001  0.0145  0.0100  0.0090  0.0120  0.0106  0.0073
2002 0.0021 0.0055 0.0044  0.0116  0.0093  0.0063
2003 0.0115 0.0141 0.0134  0.0101  0.0076  0.0042
2004 0.0098 0.0122 0.0110  0.0076  0.0053  0.0013
2005  0.0018 0.0038 0.0021  0.0122  0.0072  0.0021
2006  0.0148  0.0060  0.0084  0.0136  0.0064  0.0009
2007  0.0127  0.0021  0.0077  0.0101  0.0015 0.0016
2008 0.0021 0.0116 0.0047  0.0130  0.0038 0.0003
2009 0.0445 0.0471 0.0395  0.0049 0.0016 0.0032
Mean of absolute values 0.0061 0.0045 0.0035
1 = group 1 (28 countries)
2 = groups 1 and 2 (42 countries)
3 = groups 1, 2, and 3 (70 countries)
11Table 3
Values of sp and s
United States Excluded
sp s











1990 0.0245 0.0255  0.0014  0.0010
1991 0.0225 0.0237  0.0055  0.0045
1992 0.0343 0.0338 0.0002 0.0002
1993 0.0456 0.0426 0.0081 0.0058
1994 0.0380 0.0367 0.0065 0.0057
1995 0.0381 0.0358 0.0078 0.0063
1996 0.0360 0.0335 0.0069 0.0056
1997 0.0316 0.0311 0.0125 0.0123
1998 0.0279 0.0272 0.0121 0.0110
1999 0.0121 0.0132 0.0084 0.0075
2000 0.0046 0.0068 0.0072 0.0056 0.0048 0.0099
2001 0.0059 0.0102 0.0092 0.0063 0.0058 0.0088
2002 0.0201 0.0229 0.0189 0.0109 0.0112 0.0130
2003 0.0268 0.0286 0.0255 0.0135 0.0140 0.0160
2004 0.0279 0.0287 0.0246 0.0197 0.0190 0.0213
2005 0.0206 0.0253 0.0195 0.0158 0.0188 0.0221
2006 0.0064 0.0158 0.0088 0.0149 0.0206 0.0240
2007 0.0017 0.0144 0.0038 0.0134 0.0215 0.0217
2008 0.0032 0.0165 0.0064 0.0051 0.0143 0.0166
2009 0.0323 0.0390 0.0299 0.0077 0.0141 0.0143
Mean of absolute values 0.0089 0.0102 0.0168
1 = group 1 (27 countries)
2 = groups 1 and 2 (41 countries)
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Financial Saving Rate of the World's Private Sector (sp*)
1980-2009
the IMF values, which suggests that most of the world that matters for this purpose
is being captured.
Figure 1 plots the three sets of values of sp in Table 2. This ﬁgure is easy to
summarize. First, the values since 2000 have a similar pattern for the three sets,
and the values since 1990 have a similar pattern for the two sets. The results are
not sensitive to the addition of more countries. Second, the pattern is as follows:
1) modest ﬂuctuations around about .03 between 1980 and about 1995, 2) a large
fall between 1995 and 2000, 3) a large rise between 2000 and 2003, 4) a large fall
between 2003 and 2006, and 5) a large rise between 2006 and 2009, especially in















with United States ->
<- without United States
Figure 2
sp* with and without the United States
1980-2009
Figure 2 plots the values of sp for set 1 from both Tables 2 and 3. The values
of sp are on average larger with the United States excluded, but the patterns of the
two plots are quite close. The overall pattern is not driven by the United States.
Another way of looking at, say, the large positive value of sp in 2009 is that
governments were on average running large deﬁcits. sp was about .04 in 2009,
and so the deﬁcit of the world’s government sector was about 4 percent of world
GDP. One might say there was a world-wide government deﬁcit problem in 2009,
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sp* and S&P 500: 1980-2009
4 Some Correlations
Before discussing a possible explanation of the ﬂuctuations of sp in Figure 1, it
will be useful to examine some correlations. Figure 3 plots sp in Table 2 for set 1
(countries in group 1 including the United States) and the ratio of the S&P 500
stock price index to U.S. nominal GDP in billions, denoted S&P500. It is clear
from this ﬁgure that the two series are inversely correlated (regression results are
presented later in this section).
Although sp pertains to the entire world, whereas S&P500 pertains only to
the United States, it is the case that stock prices across many countries are highly
15positivelycorrelated(Japanbeinganexception),andsoS&P500canbeconsidered
to some extent to be a proxy for world stock prices. Figures 4a–4e and 5 show
some of these correlations.
Figures 4a–4e plot S&P500 against a stock price index of another country: 4a
for the U.K. FTSE100, 4b for the German DAX, 4c for the French CAC 40, 4d for
the Hong Kong Hang Seng, and 4e for the Japanese Nikkei. Each of these indices
is divided by the country’s nominal GDP (in the country’s currency in billions)
except for the Hang Seng, where world GDP in billions of Hong Kong dollars is
used. Figures 4a–4c show a strong positive correlation: European and U.S. stock
prices are highly correlated. Figure 4d also shows a strong correlation except for
1998and1999,wheretheAsiacrisesaffectedtheHangSengbuthadnonoticeable
effect on the S&P500. The Nikkei in Figure 4e is dominated by the huge increase
to 1988 and the huge fall thereafter. Since about 1999, however, the pattern of the
Nikkei is similar to the pattern of the S&P500.
From the OECD Economic Outlook Annex Table 58 one can get values of net
ﬁnancial wealth for six countries not counting the United States for 1998–2009.
(The variable is the ratio of net ﬁnancial wealth to nominal disposable income in
percentage points.) The six countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
and the United Kingdom. An index of net ﬁnancial wealth for these six countries
was computed using as weights the country’s GDP in 2005 in dollars. Figure 5
plots this index against S&P500. The positive correlation is again evident. The
timing is not quite as tight, which is due in part to the fact that the index is the end














84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08
<- S&P 500 (left scale)
FTSE 100 (right scale) ->
Figure 4a
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Figure 4b
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Figure 4c
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Figure 4e
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<- S&P 500 (left scale)
6-country index (right scale) ->
Figure 5
S&P 500 and 6-Country Index: 1998-2009
19Turning now to housing prices, Figure 6 plots the ratio of a U.S. housing price
index to the U.S. GDP deﬂator, denoted PHOUSE, and S&P500. It can be seen
thatthelargeincreasesinhousingpricesdidnotbeginuntilthelate1990s,whereas
the large increases in stock prices began in 1995. Also, housing prices did not fall
in the 2000–2003 period, contrary to stock prices. The most striking similarity in
the two series is the large fall in both housing prices and stock prices in 2008 and
2009.
As with stock prices, there is a positive correlation of housing prices across
many countries. From the OECD Economic Outlook Annex Table 60 one can get
values of housing price ratios for 18 countries not counting the United States for
1993–2009.2 (The variable is a price to rent ratio in percentage points.) An index
of these ratios for the 18 countries was computed using as weights the country’s
GDPin2005indollars. Figure7plotsthisindexagainstPHOUSE forthe1993–
2009 period, and a positive correlation is evident. The index begins to rise a year
later (1998 versus 1997) and it peaks a year later (2007 versus 2006). Also, the
fall in the index in 2008 and 2009 is not as large. But it is clear that the boom in
housingpricesbetweenthe late1990sandthemid2000sisnot justaUnitedStates
phenomenon. Noristhelargefallinhousingpricesin2008and2009. PHOUSE
can thus to some extent be taken to be a proxy for world housing prices.
2The 18 countries are Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia,
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Figure 7























sp* (left scale) ->
U.S. housing price variable (right scale) ->
Figure 8
sp* and U.S. Housing Price Variable: 1980-2009
Figure 8 plots PHOUSE and sp in Table 2 for set 1 (countries in group 1
including the United States) for 1980–2009. The two series are in general nega-




sp is the left-hand-side variable.
constant S&P500 S&P500 1 PHOUSE PHOUSE 1 SE R2 DW
United States included in sp
1 0.0024 -0.239 -0.541 -0.008 -0.067 0.0046 0.87 1.89
(2.72) (-2.79) (-6.04) (-0.59) (-4.12)
2 0.0025 -0.658 -0.079 0.0051 0.82 1.53
(2.49) (-7.49) (-6.76)
United States excluded from sp
3 0.0014 -0.061 -0.447 0.034 -0.083 0.0059 0.69 1.72
(1.21) (-0.54) (-3.89) (1.76) (-4.02)
4 0.0012 -0.482 -0.056 0.0060 0.64 1.57
(1.07) (-4.69) (-4.13)
Estimation period: 1982–2009, 28 observations
OLS estimates
t-statistics are in parentheses
Range of sp is -0.0224 to 0.0445 with United States included
Range of sp is 0.0017 to 0.0589 with United States excluded
Row 1 in Table 4 presents results of a regression of the change in sp, sp, on
the change in S&P500, S&P500, and the change in PHOUSE, PHOUSE,
both current and lagged one year. The lagged values dominate the current values,
and row 2 presents results using only the lagged values. The coefﬁceint estimates
of S&P500 1 and PHOUSE 1 in row 2 are negative and highly signiﬁcant.
The estimated standard error is 0.0051 (the range of sp in Table 2 is  0.0224 to
0.0445). The R2 is 0.82. A considerable amount of the variation in the change in
sp is thus explained by the previous year’s changes in S&P500 and PHOUSE.
ThisconclusionalsoholdsiftheUnitedStatesisexcludedfromsp, ascanbeseen
in rows 3 and 4 in Table 4.
235 A Possible Explanation
The discussion up to this point has been atheoretical. A fact has been documented,
and some correlations have been discussed. What is striking about the results is
how much of the variance of the change in sp has been explained in row 2 in
Table 4 by simply the one-year lagged changes in the U.S. stock price index and
the U.S. housing price variable. What can one say about this?
First, if we go back to Figure 1 and ask what exogenous variables might ex-
plain the large ﬂuctuations in sp since 1995, it seems unlikely that demographic
variables and ﬁscal-policy variables like tax rates and some kinds of government
spendingarecandidates. Demographicvariablesaretooslowmoving,anditseems
unlikelythatﬁscal-policydecisionsacrosscountriesarecoordinatedenoughand/or
changed quickly enough to account for the large changes in sp since 1995. Re-
gardingmonetarypolicies,itseemsunlikelythatworldinterestrateﬂuctuationsare
candidates. This is not to say that demographic variables, ﬁscal-policy variables,
and interest rates have no effect on sp. It’s just that the ﬂuctuations in sp since
1995 seem too large for these effects to be the main story.
If one takes S&P500 as a proxy for world stock prices and PHOUSE as a
proxy for world housing prices, then the results in row 2 in Table 4 show that the
world private saving rate is highly negatively correlated with world asset prices
as measured by one-year-lagged values of stock prices and housing prices.3One
possibletheoryisthusthatworldasset-pricechangeslikestock-pricechangesaffect
3No attempt was made for the regression work in Table 4 to include other countries’ stock prices
and housing prices. Given data availability, the estimation period would have to be shorter, and
given the high correlation of stock prices across countries and housing prices across countries, it
seemed unlikely that sensible estimates could be obtained.
24world consumption through wealth effects and affect world investment through
cost of capital effects. The simple life cycle model, for example, says that an
unanticipated increase in wealth leads, other things being equal, to an increase in
consumption. According to this model, the large ﬂuctuations in sp since 1995 are
explained by the large ﬂuctuations in world asset prices during this period. This
theoryreliesonasset-pricechangesbeingexogenoustothehouseholds’andﬁrms’
decision making processes: asset prices change for some reason independent of
these processes, and after the asset-price changes, households and ﬁrms respond.
Asecondpossibletheoryisoneinwhichthereisanexogenouschangeinhouse-
holds’andﬁrms’expectationsofsomefuturevariable,likefutureproductivity,and
this leads them to both bid asset prices up or down and to change consumption and
investment. If productivity is expected to be higher in the future than originally
thought, this would lead households to bid asset prices up and increase consump-
tion at the same time. Lantz and Sarte (2001) have a general equilibrium model
in which this effect is at work. In this theory asset-price changes do not cause
consumption and investment changes, since all three are determined by changes
in expectations. In this case it does not make sense, for example, to talk about the
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth.
It is difﬁcult to test which of these theories is a better approximation of reality.
It is interesting that in Table 4 the one-year lagged changes dominate the current-
year changes. If the second theory is correct, one might expect the current-year
changes to be more highly correlated with the change in sp, since the expectation
change affects both asset-price changes and consumption and investment changes
at the same time. On the other hand, costs of adjustment could lead consumption
25and investment changes to lag asset-price changes, and so the evidence in Table 4
in favor of the ﬁrst theory is weak.
In the ﬁrst theory the driving force behind changes in sp is an unexpected
change in asset prices, and in the second theory the driving force is an unexpected
change the future values of some variable (like productivity). Because the corre-
lation between sp and world asset prices is so large, whatever driving force is at
work, it is very important. It explains a large fraction of the variation in sp. The
contribution of this paper is showing that whatever force is operating, it changes
world asset prices. Whether the force is such that asset prices change ﬁrst, which
then affect consumption and investment, or that asset prices and consumption and
investment change at the same time is not something this paper needs to take a
stand on.
The explanation offered here of the path of sp in Figure 1 is thus that a large
fraction of the variance of sp is due to forces that change world stock prices and
world housing prices.
This explanation is to some extent bad news for macroeconomic forecast-
ers. Asset-price changes are essentially unpredictable, whether they are driven
by changes in productivity expectations or some other force, and so much of the
change in sp is unpredictable. Much of the world macro economy is at the mercy
of unpredictable forces.
This explanation is a “big picture” explanation. The present analysis is not a
substitute for structural econometric modeling of the world economy. What the
analysis suggests is that any structural model should account for the effects of
the forces that change asset prices on aggregate demand. How this is modeled
26depends in part on which of the two theories discussed above one thinks is the best
approximation of reality. The big picture that emerges from the present analysis
is that the forces behind asset price changes are very important in inﬂuencing the
world macro economy.
6 Judging Policy Makers
Iftheforcesbehindasset-pricechangesareunpredictable,thisdoesnotnecessarily
mean that policy makers have no ability to affect these changes. Take the huge
boom in U.S. stock prices between 1995 and 2000. Many people thought at the
time that this boom was a stock market bubble, but this did not appear to be the
Fed’s view. Alan Greenspan talked about a new age of productivity, and the Fed
lowered interest rates during certain bad times in the stock market.4 The view
among many was that there was a “Greenspan put” regarding stock prices. It is
possible that the Fed could have curtailed this boom by raising interest rates and
margin requirements. Policy actions like these are themselves unpredictable, and
thus changes in stock prices and housing prices can be unpredictable even though
they are inﬂuenced by (unpredictable) policy actions.
Another example is the lack of much regulation of the U.S. housing market
during the boom in housing prices between the late 1990s and 2006. Had there
been more regulation, housing prices may not have risen as much as they did. The
4Perhaps the most dramatic Fed action in this period was the surprise lowering of the federal
funds rate on October 15, 1998. The U.S. stock market was down from its highs in late September,
and the Fed cited unsettled conditions in ﬁnancial markets as one of the reasons for the decrease.
This resulted in a huge increase in stock prices after the announcement.
27bailout of ﬁnancial institutions during the 2008–2009 recession is also a policy
action that may affect stock prices.
Therefore, to the extent that the large ﬂuctuations in sp since 1995 are unde-
sirable, policy actions or lack thereof may bear part of the blame.
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